

















When the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) formally adopted the principle of ‘open regionalism’ (OR) in its trade liberalisation in 1991, many were optimistic that this approach suggested the bloc as a stepping stone toward global free trade. This optimistic view was reinforced by the economic theorising of Yi (1996). 
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Policy-makers still frequently ask ‘Are regional trading blocs stepping stones or stumbling blocks toward global free trade?’ or   ‘Is it possible to design a rule for trading bloc formation that will sustain global free trade as a stable equilibrium coalition structure?’ 

Prior to the 1997/98 Asian Financial crisis, “open regionalism” was held to offer an affirmative answer. The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) adopted it as the key principle of trade liberalisation in 1991., and  Supporters (Bergstern (1997) for example) viewed OR   as a recipe for building non-discriminatory regional trading blocs, and hence believed that regional liberalisation could  be achieved without undermining efforts at the multilateral level. Their optimistic view was greatly reinforced by the economic theorising of Yi (1996a)​[1]​.

Yi (1996) addressed these questions in a model with closed form solutions and produced neat analytical results which conclude that if we adopt ‘open regionalism’ as a rule for trade bloc formation, global free trade can be a stable equilibrium outcome.

Bhagwati (2006) and Garnaut (2004), who argue that APEC should continue to embrace it  in its pursuit of trade liberalisation. Given the current spaghetti-bowl that results from having many overlapping FTAs, some experts have suggested a modified version of OR. For example, Garnaut and Vines (2007) proposed open trading arrangements (OTA) - which contains the key element of the original concept of OR – open membership. The precise details of the OTA are not clear, but Garnaut (2004) suggests that OTA are best initiated among ‘economies of substantial size’ and that once one is established by two or more economies, it may become attractive to new members in the Asia Pacific region and beyond. 

The model in this paper suggests that a key challenge to the success of OTA is to generate sufficient interest among ‘economies of substantial size’ to take the first step of initiation. ‘Economies of substantial size’, may well not wish to get seriously involved in a trading arrangement with open membership as a rule.

This paper shows formally why OR may fail, based on theory and simple simulation modelling. We unpick Yi (1996) systematically and show that open regionalism works in his model only because of quasilinear preferences and Ricardian technology assumptions. Once these assumptions are replaced - e.g. with CES preferences and a concave production possibility curve - OR may fail to ensure global free trade as an equilibrium in a world of different sized countries even if the rest of the world adopts open regionalism rule as a strategy.





2.  Open regionalism is good: Yi’s model


Yi (1996a) considers rules for enlarging a customs union. He provides a formal analysis of two different membership rules: ‘open regionalism’ and ‘unanimous regionalism’, on the equilibrium structure of customs union​[2]​. ‘Open regionalism’ is interpreted as a rule where a nonmember country can join a customs union without having to obtain the consent of the existing members of the union. In other words, ‘open regionalism’ is defined as ‘open membership’. Under the ‘unanimous regionalism’ rule on the other hand, a nonmember country can join a customs union only when all existing members agree.

An open regionalism rule prevents existing member countries from rejecting outsiders for the fear of possible worsening of their own welfare. Yi finds that this leads customs unions to expand until they include all countries in the world – the ‘grand coalition’ – and thus he claims that it renders customs unions stepping stones to global trade liberalisation.






(a) Demand is independent of income

Yi assumes that the utility function of a representative consumer in country i has the form of

ui (qi; M) = v(qi) + Mi =  aQi - 		

where qij is country i’s consumption of country j’s product, qi  (qi1, qi2, …, qiN) is country i’s consumption profile, Qi  ,  is a substitution index between goods, and Mi is country i’s consumption of the numeraire good.  The numeraire good will be transferred across countries to settle, if there is any, the balance of trade.  The model further assumes that each country’s endowment of the numeraire good is sufficient to guarantee a positive consumption of the numeraire good in each country. 
Mi = Yi  -  ,
Noting that the maximization problem is reduced to an unconstrained maximization problem (Varian, 1992):

max     ui =  aQi -  Yi  - 		(1)

where Yi  is the  income of country i

The first order condition for good qi1, for example, is:
ui /  qi1 = - pi1 = 0

The inverse demand function for good qi1 is therefore:

pi1  =  				(2)


The demand function above shows that demand for qi1 depends on pi1, i.e. its own price in country i, and Qi, i.e. .  It is independent of income, Y. Hence there is zero income effect on good qi1 (and also all other non-numeraire goods). Any increase in income will be used to consume the numeraire good, M.

A zero income effect on the non-numeraire good also means that changes in tariffs will not have income effects on the consumption of the non-numeraire goods. This zero income effect is useful for Yi to solve his model analytically as it means that optimal tariffs are independent across countries (this is shown in the following sub-section) and hence that the optimal tariffs of a customs union are dependent only on the size of the customs union relative to the rest of the world and not on the coalition structures in the world.​[3]​


(b) No strategic interdependence of optimal tariffs across countries/customs unions

Yi assumes no transportation costs and non-negative specific tariffs, ij. The effective marginal cost of the good from country j in country i is therefore

	cij = c + ij						(3)

where cij : effective marginal cost
           c  : marginal cost (assumed common to all producers)
           ij : tariff





The first order condition for profit maximisation is therefore

pij – cij – qij = 0

which can be rewritten (using Eq. (2) and Eq. (3)) as

	 - ij – (2 - ) qij - Qi = 0				(4)





where Ti is the sum of tariffs, and

	(k)  2 -  + k, k = 1, 2, …, N				(6)

Equations (4) and (5) show that the equilibrium qij depends only on country i’s tariffs, i.e. product market equilibrium in country i depends only on country i’s tariffs. A change in country i’s tariffs on imports from country j does not affect product market equilibria in any other countries.  The effects of the tariff on country j occur solely on the numeraire good, as transfers of numeraire good from country j to country i settle the balance of trade. As a result, the optimal tariff of a country/customs union does not depend on the tariffs of the rest of the world. That is, there is no strategic interdependence of optimal tariffs across countries/customs unions.


To illustrate in a two-country model, equation (4) becomes:

 - 12 – (2 - ) q12 - Q1= 0 	 (4a)   where Q1 = q11  + q12      for country 1, and 

 - 21 – (2 - ) q21 - Q2= 0 	  (4b)  where Q2 = q22  + q21      for country 2 


Say there is an increase in tariff 12 by country 1 on q12, i.e. imports from country 2.  From eq.(4a), we can see that this will reduce the amount of  q12.  But the increase of 12 does not affect the consumption of q21, i.e. country 2’s import of the non-numeraire good from country 1, even though country 2’s exports to country 1 is reduced due to the rise in 12. This is evident from eq.(4b) which shows that the equilibrium amount of q21 is independent of the equilibrium amount of q12. 








	 for k  j,  and   	(8)

Equations (7) and (8) show that if country i raises its tariffs on imports from country j, then consumption of good j and total consumption in country i falls, and consumption of all other goods increases.  Country j’s Cournot equilibrium export profit to country i is given by

	ij = (pij – cij)qij = q2ij		(9)

using the first order condition. Hence,












2.2 Constant marginal cost






2.3 Replicating Yi’s model with numerical simulations

This section provides numerical simulations that replicate Yi’s results. Setting up Yi’s framework in a numerical model provides the basis for modifications in subsequent section.

From equation (1), we set the model’s parameter values as follows:

a = 2; c = 1;  = 0.5; E = 10;

where  a: utility function parameter
c: marginal cost
            : substitution index; a value of 0.5 indicates imperfect substitution between goods
            E: endowment of numeraire good in each country

We conduct two simulations: (i) a world model with only 2 symmetric countries; country 1 being the active country, setting an optimal tariff, while country 2 is passive, i.e. its tariff on imports is zero, (ii)  a world with 5 countries where all countries are active with tariff as a policy tool. The results are shown in Tables 1 and 2. 


Table 1 Optimal tariff of country 1 when country 2 is passive 
Trade Scenario	Country	Welfare	Tariff on Good 1	Tariff on  Good 2	Price of good 1	Price of good 2	Consumption  of good 1	Consumption of good 2
Free trade	1	10.560	0	0	1.400	1.400	0.400	0.400
	2	10.560	0	0	1.400	1.400	0.400	0.400










   Table 2 A world with 5 symmetric countries: all countries are active



































Table 2 reports outcomes in a 5-country world in which various combinations of countries create customs unions.   It shows that in the ‘No CU’ scenario, each country sets its own optimal tariff. When a customs union of country 1 and 2, CU(1,2) is formed, members determine a common external tariff, 0.2658, that maximizes the CU’s welfare. When the coalition structure changes from CU(1,2) to CU(1,2,3), the optimal tariff of members of the enlarged customs union falls from 0.2658 to 0.2647, but the optimal tariffs of non-members, i.e. countries 4 and 5, remain unchanged at 0.2500​[5]​. Optimal tariffs of countries 4 and 5 change only when they form a customs union.











3. But open regionalism is not sufficient for good

We demonstrate now how the open regionalism rule may fail to work. To do so, we make changes to Yi’s model in three stages (Table 3).

Table 3 Varying Yi’s model in 3 stages
Stage	Consumer preferences	Production technology	Type of competition
(Yi’s model)	Quasilinear preferences	Constant marginal costs	Cournot  competition
1	Quasilinear preferences	Increasing marginal costs	Cournot  competition
2	Constant elasticity of substitution preferences	Constant marginal costs	Cournot and Bertrand  competition




3.1 Stage1 – Increasing marginal costs

Yi assumes a constant marginal cost of production in his model. We remove this Ricardian technology assumption (but retaining the quasilinear preferences assumption) and replace it with an upward sloping marginal cost function, c = x + b* Qj (where Qj =, i.e. total output of good j by country j)​[7]​. Putting an increasing MC function into this model is a convenient way to convert the straight-line production possibility frontier (PPF) in Yi’s model into a concave PPF in order to reflect an increasing rate of product transformation (RPT) between the numeraire good and the differentiated good.​[8]​


The optimal tariff of a country/customs union is no longer independent of other countries’/customs union’s tariff when marginal cost is upward sloping, even though consumer preferences are still quasilinear.  Table 4 shows that when country 1 is allowed to set its optimal tariff, country 2’s consumption of good 1 and 2 changes. Consumption of good 1 by country 2 falls because the tariff-induced increase in country 1’s consumption raises 1’s costs of production. 

Table 4 Optimal tariff of country 1 when country 2 is passive – increasing marginal costs
Trade Scenario	Country	Welfare	Tariff on Good 1	Tariff on Good 2	Price of good 1	Price of good 2	Consumption  of good 1	Consumption of good 2
Free trade	1	10.592	0	0	1.400	1.400	0.400	0.400
	2	10.592	0	0	1.400	1.400	0.400	0.400




Optimal tariffs are inter-dependent in this case because, given that the marginal cost of producing the non-numeraire good is a positive function of outputs. When, say country 1 sets a tariff on its imports from country 2, its consumption of imports falls while consumption of its home good rises.  A fall in country 1’s demand for good 2 reduces country 2’s total output and its marginal cost of production. This leads to a fall in its price and hence good 2 becomes relatively cheaper than good 1 in country 2. Country 2’s consumption adjusts to this relative price change. Country 2’s optimal tariff therefore depends on country 1’s tariff level since it affects country 2’s production equilibrium, not through income effect but through the effects on marginal cost and hence prices.

When marginal cost is upward sloping, the first order condition for profit maximisation, i.e. equation (4) becomes:

	 - ij – (2 - ) qij - Qi = 0				(4) 

where  = a – c and c = x + b(i qij)

	a – x -  b(i qij) - ij – (2 - ) qij - Qi = 0		(4*)

In a two-country world, equation (4*) becomes:

a – x -  b(q11 + q21) - 12 – (2 - ) q12 - Q1= 0 	 (4*a)       for country 1 

	
a – x -  b(q22 + q12) - 21 – (2 - ) q21 - Q2 = 0 	  (4*b)     for country 2 

With marginal costs as a function of total output, equations (4*a) and (4*b) become interdependent. The equilibrium values of q21 and q12 are now interdependent, as well as those of 12 and 21. When say country 1 raises its tariff, 12 on q12, from equation (4*a), this will reduce q12.  When q12 falls, equation (4*b) shows that variables q21(country 2’s import from country 1), q22 (country 2’s consumption of home good) and 21 will adjust in order to reach a new equilibrium. 





Table 5 Five countries in the world, countries are symmetric, increasing marginal costs

































 From Table 5 (contrast this with Table 2), the optimal tariff of a country/customs union depends not only on its relative size to the world but also the composition of coalition structures in the world. This is shown when we compare between the coalition structures of a world with only one customs union, CU(1,2)  and a world with two customs unions of CU(1,2) and CU(3, 4,5). Tariffs set by members of CU(1,2) fall from 0.275 (when countries 3, 4 and 5 are separate countries) to 0.273 (when countries 3, 4 and 5 form a customs union). 

Further, the interdependence of countries’ optimal tariffs shows some interesting results. The formation of CU(1,2) raises the member’s tariffs from a pre-CU level of 0.256  to post-CU level of 0.275. Non-members, i.e. country 3, 4 and 5 lower their tariffs on imports from CU members (from 0.256 to 0.253) while tariffs between themselves are increased (from 0.256 to 0.259). This pattern where country 3, 4 and 5 set higher tariffs on non-CU members than those on CU members can be explained by the ‘import sourcing condition’ of Sinclair & Vines (1995) in the following way: first, as a result of the formation of a CU between 1 and 2, consumption of home good of the CU, i.e. goods 1 and 2, increases due to the removal of intra-bloc tariffs and higher external tariffs set on non-CU goods. Increased consumption of goods 1 and 2 also means higher marginal cost of production (given upward sloping marginal cost now) and thus higher prices. With this switch of consumption toward CU goods from non-CU goods, there is a fall in the consumption of goods 3, 4 and 5, which also means a fall in the marginal cost of production and thus a fall in prices.  All these bring the world prices of good 1 and 2 to be relatively higher than those of goods 3, 4 and 5. Since a country prefers a balanced consumption bundle to an unbalanced one given the love-of-variety preferences, these non-CU countries, say country 3, faced with two sources of imports, one from the CU, which is more expensive, and the other from the non-CU countries, which is less expensive, will therefore sets lower tariffs on CU goods and higher tariffs on non-CU goods. This pattern of non-CU countries setting higher tariffs on non-CU imports than tariffs on CU imports continues as the CU enlarges. Note that the average tariffs set by non-CU countries in all these trade scenarios stay around 0.255 – 0.256. But as the CU expands into CU (1, 2, 3, 4), country 5, which is now the only non-CU country in the world, sets higher tariffs on its imports (which are all sourced from CU countries) than the tariffs when the CU comprises countries 1, 2 and 3.  This reason for this seemingly unusual tariff pattern is simply because now there is only one source of import, i.e. they are all sourced from the CU of 1,2,3,4 and hence the ‘import-sourcing condition’ explained above disappears. Note that country 5’s optimal tariff of 0.255 is roughly the same as the average tariffs set by the non-CU countries stated earlier.






3.2 Stage 2 - CES preferences





Given this love-of-variety type preferences and that 0 <  < 1, each good is consumed in every country which means that each country exports part of its own variety of differentiated good in exchange for some imports of all other varieties of the differentiated good.





where  I :  Budget allocated for the consumption of differentiated good
P: Price index for good TG
	pj : price of good j

This demand function shows that demand for qj is an increasing function of I, income, and decreasing for pj, the price of own good​[9]​.

We consider both Cournot and Bertrand cases. In the Cournot case, each firm maximises its profit by setting its output, assuming other firms’ output levels are constant; in the Bertrand case, each firm sets its price to maximise profit, assuming other firms’ prices are constant.  

Table 6 shows simulation results of a model with two countries in the world.  When countries are symmetric in size, i.e. equal endowment of the numeraire good, it is expected that both countries are better off under global free trade than in a world with restricted trade where all countries set Nash tariffs.  But even when countries are asymmetric in size where country 1 is twice as large country 2 in its endowment of the numeraire good, the optimal tariff of country 1 is the same as the optimal tariff of country 2. Country 1, although being larger, does not have the capability to improve its terms of trade​[10]​. 


Table 6 Welfare and tariff levels under ‘No Coalition’ and ‘Global Free Trade’ (2 countries in the world)
Country’s    endowment	1 : 10 2 : 10Welfare                      Tariff	1: 202: 10Welfare                      Tariff
Trade Scenario		
No coalition	Bertrand    Cournot1: 9.618     9.5672: 9.618     9.567	Bertrand    Cournot0.031         0.0320.031         0.032	Bertrand    Cournot18.848        18.74010.006         9.962	Bertrand     Cournot0.031           0.0320.031           0.032
Global free trade	1: 9.648     9.6002: 9.648     9.600	0                 00                 0	18.878         18.77210.067         10.027	0                   00                   0


The reason that the larger country sets the same optimal tariff as the small country is the Ricardian technology assumption in the model. When marginal cost is constant, the ability of a large country to improve its terms of trade disappears because every country faces a flat foreign marginal cost in the import market, which is similar to a small country assumption. 

Table 6 also shows that as the endowment of one country, country 1, increases, the welfare level of not only this country, but also the other country increases. As country 1’s endowment of numeraire good rises, it increases its exports of numeraire good to country 2 at a price of one (as this is the numeraire good) and at the same time increases its imports of country 2’s differentiated good at a price that exceeds one (because of a price mark-up). This exchange benefits country 2 and hence country 2 gains from a rise in country 1’s endowment. 


3.3  Stage 3 – Increasing marginal costs and CES preferences





Table 7 Welfare and tariff levels under ‘No Coalition’ and ‘Global free trade’ (2 countries in the world) – CES utility and increasing marginal costs
Country’s endowment	1 : 10 2 : 10Welfare                 Tariff	1: 202: 10Welfare                  Tariff
Trade Scenario		
No coalition	Bertrand  Cournot1: 9.135   9.1092: 9.135   9.109	Bertrand   Cournot0.051         0.0510.051         0.051	Bertrand   Cournot17.711       17.6669.299         9.280	Bertrand   Cournot0.0855       0.0850.0304       0.030








Table 7  continued.
Country’s endowment	1: 302: 10Welfare                      Tariff
Trade Scenario	
No coalition	Bertrand      Cournot26.149         26.0899.452           9.439	Bertrand        Cournot0.114              0.1130.017              0.017
Global free trade	26.132         26.0759.596           9.583	0                     00                     0


When the larger country is three times larger than the smaller country, it prefers to avoid a global free trade since its welfare level is higher under ‘No Coalition’. Qualitative results are the same for both Bertrand and Cournot competitions. This result is essentially the large country case for optimal tariff as demonstrated by Johnson (1954) that a country may gain by imposing a tariff even if other countries retaliate.

Table 8 reports the Bertrand case of a 5-country world model where country 1 is endowed with 60 units of numeraire good and countries 2 to 4 have 10 each. The move into an asymmetric world raises issues of coalition formation – e.g. bargaining procedure discussed, for example by Aghion, Antrás and Helpman (2007) and Siedmann (2009). Our focus however is not on the process of coalition formation/expansion, but on the presence (or absence) of stability of a coalition once it is formed. Hence the type of coalition game, whether it is a simultaneous or sequential move game, is not particularly important here.

The scenarios listed in Table 8 effectively cover all possible outcomes of a simultaneous-move game of an asymmetric world where only one CU exists.​[11]​ Alternatively it can also be seen as a sequential-move game where in the beginning, there is no customs union in the world (no CU). Then country 1 announces an ‘address’, P1.  After observing P1, country 2 announces P2, and so on up to P5. The process is repeated, i.e. country 1 announces P1 again after observing P5, and so on until an equilibrium coalition structure is reached. To illustrate, P1 can be a proposed ‘address’ of any of the trade scenarios in Table 8. Say P1 is CU(1,2).  After observing P1, country 2 makes its announcement, P2 as CU(1,2). Country 3 will then announce P3 as CU(1,2,3) and P4 will be CU(1,2,3,4) followed by P5 that is a grand CU. But when country 1 reconsiders its P1 after observing P5, it will change to CU(2,3,4,5), that is country 1 leaves the coalition. Given this rule of sequential move, CU(2,3,4,5) may be a stable coalition. 
The sequence of country order can be changed, that is country 1 needs not be the first to announce but it can be anywhere in the order of announcement. In any case, when the game reaches country 1’s turn to consider its P1 if the address reaches the grand CU, country 1 will always chooses to leave the grand CU – the grand CU is never an equilibrium coalition structure.

This example shows that a grand customs union is unlikely to be the Nash equilibrium customs-union structure even if the open regionalism rule is adopted. This is because country 1’s welfare level is higher when all countries set Nash tariffs than under global free trade​[12]​.

Table 8  CES utility and identical increasing marginal costs (Bertrand Competition)



































































For a small country such as country 2, the best outcome would be that it is the only country that forms a customs union with the large country, country 1 (trade scenario CU(1,2) in the table). But CU(1,2) cannot be a stable equilibrium structure under open regionalism where membership of a customs union is open to outsiders. Other small countries will join to increase their welfare levels.  As more small countries join in, the large country, country 1 will find its position being worsened and hence has an incentive to leave the union.

Welfare levels in the table also suggest that there is no incentive for small countries to form customs union among themselves, as their welfare levels are higher when all countries set Nash tariffs than any customs union structures among the small countries. The reason for this is that all the small countries prefer to subsidise their imports, i.e. set negative tariffs under Nash equilibrium. But when some or all the small countries form customs union, they are constrained to set zero tariffs among members. This zero-tariff constraint changes the optimal tariffs on non-member countries (become positive tariffs) and is actually welfare reducing.

We note that some of the Nash tariffs set by small countries in both tables are negative with CES utility preferences. A negative Nash tariff is possible when a country is so small relative to the other country that the rationale for an import subsidy (due to having a flatter marginal revenue curve than its demand) outweighs all other reasons for a positive tariff (see Appendix 3).

We also note that the welfare level of the large country, country 1, is better off when there is a CU of some of the small countries, i.e. CU(2,3) and CU(2,3,4 ) (but not when all small countries form a CU), than when there is no CU in the world where each sets Nash tariffs. This is because the formation of CU among some of the small countries forces the prices of the non-CU small countries to fall as a result of trade diversion. This enables the large country to increase its tariff on imports from non-CU small countries. 


4. Effects of varying MC slope on relative size of large country

The previous section demonstrates that a sufficiently larger country, prefers to stay out of a customs union, hence a grand customs union is not an equilibrium coalition structure. Tables 8 gives an example of a large country that owns 60 per cent of the world’s endowment, but different marginal cost parameters would imply different thresholds.









Table 10 Effects of varying b on s



















Quasilinear preferences and constant marginal cost are standard assumptions in the regionalism literature (examples of recent works include Chen and Joshi (2010), Mrazova (2010), Oladi and Beladi (2008), Ornelas (2005a, b)). As Ornelas (2005a) noted, this standard treatment may pose some important restrictions (e.g. on the external tariffs of FTA). This paper shows what may happen when this standard treatment is removed.  

	This paper has explained in detail why open regionalism rule works in Yi’s model and in what conditions the rule does not work. This paper demonstrates that Yi’s conclusion that open regionalism rule is good is confined to his unique pair of assumptions, i.e. constant marginal cost and quasi-linear preferences. His claim collapses once these assumptions are replaced with a concave production possibility frontier and CES preferences in a world with asymmetric country sizes. The present paper examines the customs union case. Yi (1998) shows that if we move to the case of FTA, the open regionalism story falls apart even without our modifications. 

The construction and assumptions of this model where all goods are tradable and one of them (the numeraire good) is traded freely, i.e. tariff is zero on this good, plus the love-of-variety preferences, inherently suppress the optimal tariff levels on the non-numeraire goods. As a result, a country in such model will have less incentive to stay out of a CU and hence a grand customs union is more likely to occur. Nevertheless, this paper demonstrates that even under such circumstances, a grand customs union may still not be the equilibrium coalition.  A model with a non-tradable sector or all goods that are subject to tariffs will yield higher optimal tariffs, thereby leading to stronger incentives for countries to stay out of a CU and thus less likely to have a grand customs union.














Sensitivity test on the maximum number of countries in the world where a grand customs union is a stable outcome without open regionalism rule when MC slope increases

In Yi’s model, whether open regionalism rule matters in ensuring a stable outcome of a grand customs union depends on the substitution parameter, , and the number of countries in the world, N. Let N* be the maximum number of countries that the world can contain and still have a stable outcome of a grand customs union without open regionalism rule. Yi has shown that N* is small for all values of . Sensitivity analysis is made on N* for Model 1 (i.e. stage 1 which replaces the Ricardian technology with increasing marginal cost).  We recalibrate the model to the same initial free trade quantities each time when the slope of the marginal cost function, b increases by adjusting the intercept, x. 





x: intercept of the marginal cost function 
b: slope
	i qij: total output of the differentiated good






Table A1 N*, maximum number of countries in the world where a grand customs union is a stable outcome even without the open regionalism rule






Results in Table A1 show that as the slope of the marginal cost increases, N* falls for all values of  and the value of N* becomes less sensitive to the value of  as the slope of marginal cost curve increases.

The intuition behind this result is as follows. For an existing member of a customs union, if it accepts a new member into the CU, it gains by being able to buy the variety of the differentiated good from the new member at lower cost (since there is zero tariff now). But if it rejects a new member and continues to set Nash tariffs, it benefits from foreign rent extraction through optimal tariffs. So, whether the existing member would welcome a new member depends on these two effects. If the benefits from freer trade outweigh the gain from foreign rent extraction, a new member is welcome.. Given  and b, as the number of countries in the world, N, increases, the size of a customs union of N-1 members relative to the left-out country rises and therefore the gain from foreign rent extraction increases while the benefits from freer trade fall. There is a critical value of N where the benefits from freer trade outweigh the gain from foreign rent extraction and hence a new member is welcome, which means there is a strong incentive for countries to form a grand customs union.

As the value of the substitution parameter,  falls, goods between countries become less substitutable. Since consumers value varieties in their consumption, the benefits from freer trade increase as  falls and hence existing members are more willing to accept new members. This also means that it is more likely to achieve a grand customs union in the absence of the open regionalism rule. The critical value, N* therefore increases as  falls.

The reason why N* falls as the slope of MC, b, rises is that when MC is horizontal, the cost of one extra unit of imported good and the cost of one extra unit of domestic good are the same. But when MC slopes upward, the marginal cost of acquiring one extra unit of imported good is higher than the marginal cost of acquiring one extra unit of domestic good.  The benefits from foreign rent extraction increase as the slope of MC increases. The critical value, N* therefore falls as b increases.











Appendix 2  Deriving marginal revenue function of a CES demand

We show here that with a CES utility function, the demand curve can be steeper than its marginal revenue curve.

A CES demand function for good 1 has the following form:

q1  =  a1. (p1/ P)- . M/P

where q1: quantity demanded for good 1
	a1: CES share parameter for good 1
	p1: price of good 1





Total revenue of selling q1 is,

R1 = p1. q1
     
     
     
     
     



























The slope of MR1, dMR1/dq1 = dMR1/dp1 . dp1/dq1  

dp1/dq1 is the slope of demand.

If    0 < dMR1/dp1  < 1, then dMR1/dq1 < dp1/dq1   (marginal revenue is flatter than demand)

If     dMR1/dp1  > 1, then dMR1/dq1 > dp1/dq1   (marginal revenue is steeper than demand)





To see how dMR1/dp1 changes with p1, simulations are made on a range of p1, given p2=1, a1=0.5, a2 =0.5, M=10, =5, assuming there are two goods.  The values chosen for a1, a2 , M and  are based on the parameters in our main model. The results are shown in Table A2.













The values for dMR1/dp1 are positive but less than 1. This means that given the parameters of p2=1, a1=0.5, a2 =0.5, M=10, =5, marginal revenue is flatter than its demand curve for the price range shown above.








Components of optimal tariffs in the CES model with market power

The overall tariff set by a country in our model can be decomposed into 4 components as follows. Note that (i), (iii), (iv) are positive tariffs but (ii) is a negative tariff (i.e. import subsidy). The presence of component (ii) in the model explains why we have relatively low optimal tariffs in our simulation results.

(i) Gros-type tariff
Given this model where firms set mark-up prices in all goods (non-numeraire) markets, a tariff is desired for the reasons as explained in Gros (1987): when price exceeds marginal cost in the home good market, consumers see the price as the cost of home good but the true cost to the country is actually measured by the marginal cost. A positive tariff is desired in order to increase the domestic price of imports so as to bring the price ratio between home and import goods closer to the true social cost ratio between the two goods. 


(ii) Rent-extraction-type tariff (to extract rent from foreign firm with market power)





This is the standard optimal tariff. It arises when the marginal cost rises when output rises explained by Helpman and Krugman (1989, Ch4: p52).

(iv) Export-tax-equivalent-type tariff 

When the firms engage in Bertrand competition, there is a case for export taxation. This is because the firms perceive a more elastic demand curve (and thus a more elastic marginal revenue curve) than the true demand and true marginal revenue. The incorrect perceived demand and marginal revenue results in an export price (an export amount) that is lower (higher) than the economy’s optimum.  An export tax can be used to correct this wrong perceived demand function (Helpman and Krugman, 1989: Ch5:pp97-102).
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^1	  Google Scholar records that Yi (1996a) has been cited 190 times (as at 16 Dec 2010). Two recent examples are Chen & Joshi (2010) and Seidmann (2009).
^2	  In another paper, Yi has used a simple four-country example to illustrate his model in comparing the effects of the two membership rules on the equilibrium customs union structure (Yi, 1996b). 
^3	  We show later in the paper that this quasi-linear utility assumption is necessary but not sufficient to produce independent optimal tariffs among customs unions. The assumption of constant marginal cost in Yi’s model is also crucial in order to arrive at this result.
^4	  The value of  actually has an effect on the value of equilibrium quantities and optimal tariffs but it does not affect the signs of these variables. Normalising  = 1 makes equation (5) neat without changing the signs of these variables in subsequent equations (7) and (8) and hence does not change the qualitative results.
^5	  The optimal tariff of a customs union is not a monotonic function of the number of members because there are two conflicting effects when a customs union expands. On the one hand an individual country would want to reduce its external tariffs since it eliminates tariffs on more imported goods as the CU expands and because it prefers a balanced consumption bundle to an unbalanced one. This is basically the ‘import sourcing’ condition explained by Sinclair and Vines (1995). On the other hand, this country also considers other members’ export profits to this country since it maximises the joint welfare of member countries and hence would increase its external tariffs so that other members benefit through higher export profits to this country. Whether optimal tariff of members falls or rises as a customs union enlarges depends on the number of countries in the world. A detailed explanation is found in Yi (1996a).  
^6	  Yi assumes that countries are ex ante identical in endowment size. But even when countries are asymmetric in endowment size, results on tariffs, prices and quantities will be identical to the symmetric case. The only changes are on the utility levels and the consumption of numeraire good by larger country. This is because with quasilinear preferences, a larger country, i.e. one with more endowment of the numeraire good, will not be any different from a smaller country in its demand for the non-numeraire good since demand for the non-numeraire good is independent of income. And with a Ricardian technology, a large country behaves exactly like a small country since the terms of trade are fixed between countries, as it does not have any ability to affect its terms of trade. As a result, Yi’s claim that open regionalism is good under the symmetric case will continue to hold under asymmetric endowment size, provided that all other assumptions in the model are retained.
^7	  We recalibrate the simulation model so that the same free trade equilibrium quantities of differentiated goods are retained as in our simulation of Yi’s model.  
^8	  A concave PPF captures the characteristics of most production situations: either diminishing returns, specialised inputs or differing factor intensities between goods.
^9	  With a CES demand function in this model, the demand curve can be steeper than its marginal revenue curve. Appendix 2 provides further explanations.
^10	  We also observe that the Nash tariff levels of 0.031 under Bertrand competition and 0.032 under Cournot competition are notably lower compared with other studies reported in the literature that also use CES utility function (for example, Krugman (1991)). This outcome of low tariffs in our model is due to the presence of a negative tariff component in the overall optimal tariff. See explanation on the ‘rent-extraction’ type tariff in Appendix 3.
^11	  A world with two CUs, for example a world with CU(1,2) & CU(3,4,5) or a world with CU(2,3) & CU(4,5) & 1 as an individual, is excluded from the list for simplicity.  This does not affect our conclusion since our question is on whether a grand CU is a stable coalition.
^12	  Results for the Cournot-type competition are similar to the Bertrand case.
^13	  The elasticity of substitution (e.o.s.) in this case is = 1/(1- θ) = 5. Changing the e.o.s. value in the model has different effects on each of the four components of the optimal tariff listed in Appendix 3. To mention briefly, an increase in e.o.s. : (i) reduces the ‘Gros-type’ tariff – since higher e.o.s. means a smaller gap between price and MC, hence the Gros-type tariff needed to reflect the true relative cost between home and foreign goods is reduced; (ii) diminishes the ‘rent-extraction’ type tariff – this negative component of tariff should diminish and eventually disappear as e.o.s. increases since a flatter demand curve means smaller difference in slopes between the demand and marginal revenue curves; (iii) reduces the ‘marginal-import-cost-type’ tariff – since flatter demand creates a smaller difference between MC and marginal import cost; (iv) reduces the ‘export-tax-equivalent-type’ tariff – since less tariff is needed to extract the potential monopoly profit as well as to correct the wrongly perceived demand function since the  perceived and actual demand functions converge. Sensitivity tests on e.o.s. values 5 – 10 have been conducted and all leads to similar conclusion. Results are available upon request.
^14	  But when markets are in Cournot competition - firms set output quantity assuming others do not change theirs, a firm has a perceived demand curve that is less elastic than the actual demand curve. This causes an underexport and therefore a rationale for a negative export tax, i.e. export subsidy. 
